Linkerd and Pod Security Policies (PSP)
The Linkerd control plane comes with its own minimally privileged
Pod Security Policy
and the associated RBAC resources. This Pod Security Policy is enforced only if
the PodSecurityPolicy
admission controller is enabled.
To view the definition of the control plane’s Pod Security Policy, run:
kubectl describe psp -l linkerd.io/control-plane-ns=linkerd
Adjust the value of the above label to match your control plane’s namespace.
Notice that to minimize attack surface, all Linux capabilities are dropped from
the control plane’s Pod Security Policy, with the exception of the NET_ADMIN
and NET_RAW
capabilities. These capabilities provide the proxy-init
init
container with runtime privilege to rewrite the pod’s iptable
. Note that adding
these capabilities to the Pod Security Policy doesn’t make the container a
privileged
container. The control plane’s Pod Security Policy prevents container privilege
escalation with the allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
policy. To understand the
full implication of the NET_ADMIN
and NET_RAW
capabilities, refer to the
Linux capabilities manual.
More information on the iptables
rules used by the proxy-init
init
container can be found on the Architecture
page.
If your environment disallows the operation of containers with escalated Linux
capabilities, Linkerd can be installed with its CNI plugin,
which doesn’t require the NET_ADMIN
and NET_RAW
capabilities.
Linkerd doesn’t provide any default Pod Security Policy for the data plane because the policies will vary depending on the security requirements of your application. The security context requirement for the Linkerd proxy sidecar container will be very similar to that defined in the control plane’s Pod Security Policy.
For example, the following Pod Security Policy and RBAC will work with the injected
emojivoto
demo application:
apiVersion: policy/v1beta1
kind: PodSecurityPolicy
metadata:
name: linkerd-emojivoto-data-plane
spec:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
fsGroup:
ranges:
- max: 65535
min: 10001
rule: MustRunAs
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
allowedCapabilities:
- NET_ADMIN
- NET_RAW
- NET_BIND_SERVICE
requiredDropCapabilities:
- ALL
runAsUser:
rule: RunAsAny
seLinux:
rule: RunAsAny
supplementalGroups:
ranges:
- max: 65535
min: 10001
rule: MustRunAs
volumes:
- configMap
- emptyDir
- projected
- secret
- downwardAPI
- persistentVolumeClaim
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
name: emojivoto-psp
namespace: emojivoto
rules:
- apiGroups: ['policy','extensions']
resources: ['podsecuritypolicies']
verbs: ['use']
resourceNames: ['linkerd-emojivoto-data-plane']
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
metadata:
name: emojivoto-psp
namespace: emojivoto
roleRef:
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: Role
name: emojivoto-psp
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: default
namespace: emojivoto
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: emoji
namespace: emojivoto
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: voting
namespace: emojivoto
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: web
namespace: emojivoto
Note that the Linkerd proxy only requires the NET_ADMIN
and NET_RAW
capabilities when running without Linkerd CNI, and it’s run with UID 2102
.